From 49421872ecbc4fa0c2e0ba3a3158d858652c5044 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Lee Jones Date: Mon, 9 Mar 2026 14:59:29 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] HID: core: Mitigate potential OOB by removing bogus memset() ANBZ: #34816 commit 0a3fe972a7cb1404f693d6f1711f32bc1d244b1c upstream. The memset() in hid_report_raw_event() has the good intention of clearing out bogus data by zeroing the area from the end of the incoming data string to the assumed end of the buffer. However, as we have previously seen, doing so can easily result in OOB reads and writes in the subsequent thread of execution. The current suggestion from one of the HID maintainers is to remove the memset() and simply return if the incoming event buffer size is not large enough to fill the associated report. Suggested-by Benjamin Tissoires Signed-off-by: Lee Jones [bentiss: changed the return value] Signed-off-by: Benjamin Tissoires [Fixes conflicts by PatchPilot] Fixes: CVE-2026-43048 Assisted-by: PatchPilot Signed-off-by: Xunlei Pang --- drivers/hid/hid-core.c | 7 ++++--- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) diff --git a/drivers/hid/hid-core.c b/drivers/hid/hid-core.c index f728efb285d3..6119a08899fd 100644 --- a/drivers/hid/hid-core.c +++ b/drivers/hid/hid-core.c @@ -1768,9 +1768,10 @@ int hid_report_raw_event(struct hid_device *hid, int type, u8 *data, u32 size, rsize = HID_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE; if (csize < rsize) { - dbg_hid("report %d is too short, (%d < %d)\n", report->id, - csize, rsize); - memset(cdata + csize, 0, rsize - csize); + hid_warn_ratelimited(hid, "Event data for report %d was too short (%d vs %d)\n", + report->id, rsize, csize); + ret = -EINVAL; + goto out; } if ((hid->claimed & HID_CLAIMED_HIDDEV) && hid->hiddev_report_event) -- Gitee